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Introduction
First-person accounts (1PAs) are written, verbal or intentional 
(conscious) behaviour, e.g. sign language, accounts related to what 
a person feels, perceives or thinks, in other words, every mental 
content the person is aware of and can communicate to others if 
requested or desired. “I feel happy today”; “I see a pink rose”; “This 
panorama is awesome”; and “I think I had better do it tomorrow”, 
etc. are some typical examples.
On the contrary, third-person accounts (3PAs), are identical types 
of accounts plus their neuro and psychophysiological correlates, 
obtained by people who observe or measure other behaviour and 
mental contents and processes. “He seems happy”; “She’s looking 
at a rose”, and “He pushed the red button”, are example of verbal 
accounts. “The power of his EEG alpha band had an increase 
of 10%, when he relaxed”; “The medial frontal cortex increased 
its activity when she smiled at her partner”, and “Her heart rate 
decreased from 80 bpm to 60 bpm, when she heard pleasant music”, 
are examples of neuro and psychophysiological correlates of 
mental activity of the observed person.
In this essay, we will support the claim that a) some 1PAs cannot 
be reduced to third-person neural and psychophysiological corre-
lates accounts (3PAs) (We will not enter here in the debate about 
how 1PAs can also considered 3PAs (Piccinini, 2010) with particu-
lar reference to the heterophenomenology as defined by Dennett 
(2003) and b) that their contents are the only information to reckon 
when it is necessary to analyse qualia contents, that is, emotions, 
beliefs, reality interpretations, quality of life and health and their 
effects on behaviour and the brain activity. Consequently, c) even 
a complete description of the brain and psychophysiological corre-
lates of these 1PAs does not add any further information about their 
contents and characteristics.
This approach is at odds with the view that given the subjective and 
introspective nature of 1PAs, they lack objective contents and hence 
3PAs are undeniably more informative.
There is not space here to describe the historical reasons of why, in 
psychology, 1PAs lost their importance in comparison to 3PAs. For 
those readers interested in this topic we suggest to refer to Klein 
(2015b).
When first-person accounts are not reliable
Since the seminal paper of Nisbett & Wilson (1977) evidence has 
been accumulated showing that people 1PAs can fail in the detec-
tion of their decision processes (but see Petitmengin et al., 2013, for 
a manipulation which reverted the accuracy to an high level).
According to Schooler (2015), 1PAs become unreliable when 
translation dissociations occur. Translation dissociations 
“correspond to situations in which, while in the process of 
re-representation, one omits, distorts, or otherwise misrepresents 
one’s mental state to oneself and/or others.”page 9.
A typical example is the monitoring of mind-wandering which is 
typically measured using self-catching and experience sampling 
techniques. Self-catching asks participants to monitor their mental 
activity and signal, for example by pressing a button, when they 
notice their mind activity was off-task. With experience sampling 
techniques, participants are probed to notice whether their mind 
was wandering at random time intervals.
When first-person accounts are the only valid 
information to consider
Below is a (non-exhaustive) list of phenomena and conditions that 
can be described and known only by 1PAs whereas the third-person 
correlates are irrelevant in order to understand their characteristics. 
For each of the selected phenomena we will present some examples 
of 1PAs and 3PAs to make evident the different informational value 
of these accounts as supportive of our main thesis.
Sensations and Emotions
Emotions and Emotion (Mood) Disorders. Emotions identifica-
tion and their valence and arousal can be measured only taking 
in account 1PAs. For example the Self-Assessment Manikin in 
different version, see Figure 1 as an example, was used for the 
database of the International Affective Pictures System, whereas 
bipolar semantic slider scales from from 1 to 9, were used for the 
Nencki Affective Picture System (Marchewka et al., 2014)
As for the measure of emotions triggered by pictures, faces, per-
sons, etc., even the measure of the mood and its disorders can only 
be done by referring to 1PAs, usually by way of structured ques-
tionnaires, e.g. the Beck Depression Inventory or interviews, e.g. 
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5 (SCID-5), in which 
participants respond with their extent of agreement with statements 
such as “I feel sad” or “I don’t cry any more than usual”, etc.
On the contrary, neuro and psychophysiological accounts (e.g. 
Allen et al., 2004; Lin et al., 2010), consists of biological 
signals that cannot convey any subjective and qualitative informa-
tion about their contents but simply represent a correlation with a 
different type of information. For example Matsubara et al. (2016), 
found that the anterior cingulate cortex volume could be a distinct 
endophenotype of bipolar disorders, while the insular volume could 
be a shared bipolar disorders and major depressive disorder endo-
phenotype. Moreover, the insula could be associated with cogni-
tive decline and poor outcome in bipolar disorders. Can we use this 
information to integrate our knowledge about the characteristics of 
bipolar and depressive disorders of those participants?
Pain
Visual analogue, numerical rating and verbal rating scales (see 
Figure 2) are commonly used to assess pain intensity in clinical 
trials and in other types of studies. Among the multidimensional 
questionnaires designed to assess pain, the McGill Pain Ques-
tionnaire and Brief Pain Inventory are valid in many multilingual 
versions (Caraceni et al., 2002).
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Figure 1. An example of the Self-Assessment Manikin for the measure of emotions’ characteristics. In this case the participant is 
requested to rate the emotional valence and arousal of a stimulus on a 5-point scale. This figure has been reproduced with permission from 
Li et al., 2011.
Figure 2. Example of a visual analog scale to measure pain. Participants are requested to rate their perceived pain choosing one of the 
six different options. No copyrighted figure.
An example of a 3PAs account is “The insula ipsilateral to the site 
of needling was activated to a greater extent during real acupunc-
ture than during the placebo intervention” (Pariente et al., 2005). 
It seems clear that this type of information cannot convey any 
useful information about the subjective quality of pain of the 
persons experiencing it.
Conscious experiences
Anomalous or non-ordinary experiences
Anomalous or non-ordinary experiences comprise a large group 
of personal experiences characterized by the lack of any clinical 
psychopathological syndrome, even if they may appear associated 
with some of them (Cardeña & Facco, 2015; Cardeña et al., 2014).
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Among these experiences there are:
Spiritual experiences. Spiritual experiences, independently from 
how they are obtained, e.g. spiritual practices, e.g. meditation 
(Chen et al., 2011), spontaneously or by using psychotropic drugs 
like the psilocybin (Griffiths et al., 2008), are only based on 1PAs.
The Revised Mystical Experience Questionnaire (Barrett et al., 
2015) is one of the available questionnaires for the investigation 
of these experiences. Participants are requested to express their 
degree of experience related, for example to: loss of usual sense 
of time; experience of amazement; sense that the experience 
cannot be described adequately in words; gain of insightful 
knowledge experienced at an intuitive level, etc.
Beauregard & Paquette (2006), investigated the neural correlates 
of such a type of experiences in a group of Carmelite nuns and 
found that this state was associated with significant loci of activa-
tion in the right medial orbitofrontal cortex, right middle temporal 
cortex, right inferior and superior parietal lobules, right caudate, 
left medial prefrontal cortex, left anterior cingulate cortex, 
left inferior parietal lobule, left insula, left caudate, and left 
brainstem. Can we achieve better understanding of the quality of 
these experiences with this information?
Near-Death-Experiences. Near-Death-Experiences are peculiar 
mental experiences reported by persons who suffered severe inju-
ries, e.g. cardiac arrest (Agrillo, 2011; Facco & Agrillo, 2012; van 
Lommel, 2011), characterized by increased vividness and sense of 
reality with respect to the normal awake state when neither con-
sciousness nor cortical activity is expected: e.g. “Super awake. 
I could sense things more than I do in my usual state of awareness”, 
plus other peculiar experiences, for example encounters with spir-
itual beings: e.g. “I do remember a being of light, God, standing 
near me” and experiences of living a timeless dimension: e.g. 
“I became time and space”, etc. (Excerpts from the http://www.
nderf.org/Archives/exceptional.html database)
Mobbs & Watt, (2011) are among those who are trying to explain 
these experiences as simply epiphenomena of some neural activ-
ity. For example, they stated: “the vivid pleasure frequently experi-
enced in near-death experiences may be the result of fear-elicited 
opioid release, while the life review and REM components of the 
near-death experience could be attributed to the action of the locus 
coeruleus- noradrenaline system”(page 449). However statements 
like these, take for granted that the neural correlates “translate” 
into subjective experiences forgetting to offer a testable hypoth-
esis on how this transformation can take place. Furthermore, this 
hypothesis of opioids has several weakenesses (Ersek et al., 2004; 
Facco, 2010; Facco & Agrillo, 2012; Lawlor & Bruera, 2002; 
Vella-Brincat & Macleod, 2007), that is: a) opioids are only wake 
hallucinogens, b) people administered opioids for pain therapy do 
not experience NDEs, while their adverse events may include a 
delirium, the phenomenology of which is totally different with 
fromNDEs; c) No hallucinogens induce standard reproducible 
experiences, which largely depend on subjects’ personalities, aims 
of their intake, context and rituality. In other words, when new facts 
challenge the endorsed axioms and theories, they are first inter-
preted trying to constraint them within the available knowledge, 
while their explanation may call for new, yet unknown, laws of 
nature (i.e., properties of consciousness).
Memory
Differently from implicit memory, e.g. procedural and associa-
tive memory, all aspects of explicit memory, e.g. autobiographical, 
semantic, have to rely only on 1PAs (Wilson, 2002). For example, 
testing autobiographical memory requires the participants to 
retrieve and describe personal life episodes, e.g. celebrations, 
deseases, special encounters with friends and relatives, etc.
Moreover Klein (2015) extensively discussed that in order to 
qualify as memory, “the product of learning needs to be a 
mental state that includes the feeling that one is reliving a past 
experience—that is, it provides a directly-given, non-inferential 
sense that one’s current mental state reflects a happening from 
one’s past.” (page 2). This distinction allows to interpret a series 
of impairments characterized by a dissociation between memory 
contents and the feeling of ownership of them (Klein, 2015a)
As to an example of 3PAs, Conway et al. (2001), recording the 
slow cortical potentials, found that left frontal negativity prima-
rily reflects cortical activation associated with the operation of a 
complex retrieval process, whereas the later temporal and occipi-
tal negativity (the result of the retrieval process) reflects activation 
corresponding to the formation and maintenance of a detailed 
memory. Can you extract useful information related to the 
contents and the subjective experience of memory of participants 
from these data?
Reasoning
Among the many tasks that can be used to investigate reasoning, 
one is to judge whether the final statement after a series of prop-
ositions is true or false. For example, “All men are animals. All 
animals are mortal. Hence, all men are mortal.”: True or False?. 
Papageorgiou et al. (2016), investigated the EEG correlates of a 
series of valid and paradoxical statements and found that “During 
the processing of paradoxes, results demonstrated a more positive 
event-related potential deflection (P300) across frontal regions, 
whereas processing of valid statements was associated with 
noticeable P300 amplitudes across parieto-occipital regions”. Is 
there any useful information in these data that can integrate what 
the participants experience as thoughts, feelings and emotions?
Furthermore, any judgement in terms of true vs false, is closely 
dependent on culture and available knowledge and, thus, is intrin-
sically weak and provisional. Judgements on both truth and fal-
sity as well as paradoxes may change over time: for example the 
unity of space-time and matter-energy, the Heisnberg’s principle of 
indetermination and the concept of entanglement look to be true in 
quantum physics, false or ununderstandable acording to classical, 
Newtonian physics. Thus, neurophysiological data about judge-
ments can only provide an estimation of brain mechanisms and, 
at best, helping one to check wheter the subject is processing them 
as paradoxes or valid statemens, without any possible inference on 
subject’s experience, cultural components and, last but not least, 
on knowledge and comprehension of the truth, which remains in 
the realm of mind.
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Beliefs and Self-evaluations
Beliefs and delusional beliefs
All cultural, ethical, religious, cultural and scientific beliefs as 
well as all kinds of delusional beliefs, can only be known by 
using 1PAs (e.g. Coltheart et al., 2011; Jonas & Fischer, 2006; 
Zeidler et al., 2002).
For example, Kapogiannis et al. (2009), investigated the neural 
correlates of three psychological dimensions of religious belief 
(God’s perceived level of involvement, God’s perceived emotion, 
and doctrinal/experiential religious knowledge). Participants 1PAs 
were obtained by requesting to rate different statements, e.g. “God 
cares about the worlds’welfare”; “All religions have truth”, on 
a 7-point Likert scale. The neural correlates of these dimensions 
were investigated by using fMRI. These authors found different 
neural networks associated with the three religious beliefs, e.g. 
more activation of bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis 
and Brodman area 45 in relationship with God’s lack of involve-
ment and more activaction of the right middle frontal gyrus and 
Broadman area 11 in relationship to statements reflecting God’s 
love etc.
How much information can we add to what we obtained from 1PAs 
by using these 3PAs?
Hallucinations
Visual and auditory hallucinations such as hearing voices (Holt 
& Tickle, 2014), can be identified and assessed by using 1PAs 
(Haddock et al., 1999).
Barkus et al. (2007), investigating the neural correlates of non-
clinical auditory hallucinations of a group of participants by using 
the fMRI, found increased activation in the superior and middle 
temporal cortex. Does this information helped to increase what 
authors already knew about the auditory hallucinations of their 
participants?
Placebo
The core components of placebo and nocebo effects are expecta-
tions/beliefs and conditioned reactions (Price et al., 2008; Rief 
& Petrie, 2016). Whereas conditioned reactions can be activated 
bypassing any mental activity, expectations and beliefs are intrinsi-
cally 1PAs independently from whether people are aware or not of 
them (Jensen et al., 2012) and cannot be interpretable by using their 
neural correlates.
Risk perception
Risk perception both for natural, economic, political and hazard 
events is another important mental content that can only measured 
by using 1PAs (Sjoberg, 2000).
For example, Schmälzle et al. (2011), investigated the HIV risk per-
ception by presenting photographs of unknown persons and record-
ing the EEG evoked response potentials.
They found that the implicit processing of individuals prone to 
risky behavior was associated with an early occipital negativity 
(240–300 ms) and a subsequent central positivity between 430 and 
530 ms compared to individuals with safer practices. It appears evi-
dent that this information cannot be used to increase the knowledge 
about risk perception obtained by 1PAs.
Aesthetic appreciation and judgments
All natural (Daniel & Meitner, 2001), human (Berggren et al., 
2010), animal and aesthetic appreciation and judgments, can only 
be assessed by 1PAs (Leder et al., 2004).
Thakral et al. (2012), investigated the neural correlates of van Gogh 
paintings evoking a range of motion experience by using the fMRI 
and found that the sensory motion processing region MT+ activ-
ity was correlated to the degree of motion experience (but not the 
experience of pleasantness), whereas the experience of pleasant-
ness (but not motion experience) was associated with an inceased 
activity in the right anterior prefrontal cortex. Can this neural 
information add any useful information about pleasantness and 
motion appreciation experienced by these participants?
Quality of life and health
The World Health Organisation (WHO) define quality of life (QoL) 
as “individuals’ perception of their position in life in the context of 
the culture and value systems in which they live and in relation to 
their goals, expectations, standards and concerns” (WHO, 1998). 
QoL is evaluated by different versions of questionnaire of which the 
best known are those developed by the WHOQOL groups (WHO, 
1998; WHOQOL Group, 1995).
Urry et al. (2004) requested their participants to complete self-
report measures of eudaimonic (leading a virtuous life and doing 
what is worth doing) well-being, hedonic well-being, and positive 
affect and subsequently recorded their EEG activity. They found a 
greater left than right superior frontal activation association with 
higher levels of both forms of well-being. May we use this informa-
tion to gather more details about what already participants reported 
in their 1PAs?
Discussion
As anticipated in the introduction, the aim of this essay was that 
of supporting the claim that there are many varieties of 1PAs the 
contents and characteristics of witch can be known and investigated 
only by these accounts and cannot be integrated with informa-
tion gathered by 3PAs in particular those related to their neural or 
psychophysiological correlates.
We have listed ten types of phenomena that can be studied only 
by referring to 1PAs, even if for each of them there is a legiti-
mate interest in knowing their neural and psychophysiological 
correlates. However it is important to realize, on the part of 
both researchers and the funders of their investigations, that the 
knowledge of their neural and psychophysiological correlates has 
nothing to add to the knowledge of these phenomena.
According to the authors of “Neuromania: on the limits of 
brain science” (Legrenzi & Umiltà, 2011) the popularity of the 
prefix “neuro” before economy (Camerer et al., 2005), aesthetics 
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(Skov & Vartanian, 2009), marketing (Ariely & Berns, 2010), the-
ology (Barrett, 2011), etc., represents a degeneration of an acriti-
cal adhesion of a metaphysical physicalism or mind-brain identity 
theory and of a superficial knowledge of the complex relationship 
between mind contents and its neural correlates. Many authors 
continue to alert researchers about the problems in defining such 
relationship. Max Colthearth for example repeatedly warned that 
“testing theories of cognition” by using fMRI investigations 
requires “both sensitivity (a claim that brain region X will always be 
active when cognitive process C is being executed) and specifi-
city (the claim that brain region X will not be active except when 
cognitive process C is being executed). pag.102 (Coltheart, 2013) 
avoiding the so-called “consistency fallacy” that is the erroneous 
inference that when data that are consistent with some theory they 
cannot, just in virtue of this consistency, be offered as the only 
evidence in support of that theory. Something additional is needed, 
that is, evidence against the contradictory of the hypothesis.
Our statement that 1PAs are irriducible to 3PAs, could be falsified 
by the evidence suggesting that it is possible to change 1PAs by 
acting on their biological correlates. For example Saitoh et al. 
(2007) were successful in reducing pain due to spinal cord or 
peripheral lesions by applying high-frequency repetitive transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation on the primary motor cortex. Conversely, 
hypnosis may yield a significant increase of pain threshold up to the 
level of surgical anesthesia: providing proper instructions and sug-
gestions to the patient (Facco et al., 2011; Facco et al., 2013); this is 
a very relevant fact allowing for Enhanced Recovery After Surgery 
without costs and adverse events (Facco, 2016); the same is for medi-
tation a valuable introspctive technique sharing several features with 
hypnosis (Facco, 2017). As a result, the 1PA is no less relevant 
than 3PA, even in the context of the pragmatic approach of 
clinical medicine, despite having been understated by the ruling 
reductionist paradigm.
The main aim of our paper is not that of supporting the view that 
the study of the biological correlates of many 1PAs is irrelevant and 
a waste of resources, but that the information we can gather from 
1PAs are irriducible to 3PAs and these cannot increase the informa-
tion we got from 1PAs even when is it possible to infer a direct 
causal relationship between 3PAs and 1PAs. In fact in the Saitoh 
et al. (2007) example, the modification of primary cortex activ-
ity do not contain any useful information about the participants’ 
change in pain perception.
Our approach is akin Jack’s (2013) statements “.. our experiential 
understanding of our own minds is fundamentally different from, 
and at least to some degree incompatible with, our understanding 
of the mind as a mechanism. At the same time, this experiential 
understanding is no less important than our mechanistic under-
standing of the mind. In fact, it is more important. Our experiential 
perspective guides our understanding of ourselves, and serves as 
the compass which aids our navigation through the social world, 
allowing us to see, and ultimately connect to, the humanity in 
others. page 670”.
Similar position is held by Guta, (2015): “..the knowledge [neu-
ronal, chemical, electrical activities that take place in the brain] 
we gather in this regard, no matter how detailed it may turn out to 
be, offers no help whatsoever in and of itself by way of giving us 
access to the first-person data. To retrieve the latter data, the right 
thing to do would be to directly engage with subjects of experience, 
that is, with people. The imaging techniques scan brains but not 
people’s thoughts/intentions/plans/regrets, and the list goes on and 
on. page 241”
We hope this essay will alert all scientists who are endorsing a 
metaphysical fisicalist approach who posit that all mind con-
tents are nothing but a byproduct of the brain or emerging prop-
erties of its computational complexity (Schwartz et al., 2016; 
Smart, 2014) that for many phenomena, the 1PAs are the only 
reliable source of information available and that the knowledge 
of their neural and psychophysical correlates does not offer any 
additional information about them. Furthermore, the wealth of 
data available on hypnosis and meditation see (Facco, 2014; Facco, 
2017), as well as music perception and performance (Fauvel et al., 
2014; Han et al., 2009; Koelsch et al., 2005; Ohnishi et al., 2001) 
provide an increasing evidence that the mind-brain relationship is 
not an unidirectional one, defined by a bottom-up hierarchy from 
brain to mind; rather, it can be better conceived as a bidirectional 
relationship, where mind may also engender both functional and 
steady, structural changes in the brain. Needless to say, music, its 
value and meaning, can only exist in the realm of 1PA. The whole 
problem is endowed with huge epistemological and metaphysical 
implications, to be reappraised in order to avoid any inadvertent 
dogmatic drift in the scientific approach to the world of subjectivity 
(Klein, 2013)
Given the enormous investments in the brain research both in the 
USA and Europe (see Global Brain Workshop, 2016; Markram, 
2012), there is a serious risk that very few research resources 
(e.g. funds, personnel, etc.) will be devoted to the investigation 
of 1PAs. It is curious that a similar worry is shared by supporters 
of a mind-brain fisicalist metaphysic like Schwartz et al., (2016), 
when they declare that “..an eliminative reductionist perspective, in 
which behaviors, thoughts, feelings, and other experiences can be 
completely explained by biological processes at the cellular and 
molecular levels, may be difficult to square with much current 
scholarship in neuroscience and in the broader field of psychology. 
Nevertheless, given the dependence of researchers, departments, 
and universities on federal grant funding, priorities emphasized by 
funding agencies and by their review committees may “force the 
hands” of researchers, departments, and universities to prioritize 
neuroscience at the expense of other approaches”. Page 15
Following Stanley Klein discussion about the limitations of reduc-
ing the study of Psychological Science to its biological mechanisms, 
we endorse his claim that “experiential aspects of reality (reflected 
in mental construct terms such as memory, belief, thought, and 
desire) give us reason to remain open to the need for psychological 
explanation in the treatment of mind.” (Klein, 2016)
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Reply: even if in the paper we mainly referred to 3P neuro- and psychophysiological
correlates, even the 3PA “ ” cannot convey any reliable informationShe feels happy today
about how the person really feels happy. This 3PA remains an independent source of
information and cannot guarantee what really the person feel. It is like to state “Peter felt a
”, but only Peter can describe the degree andstrong pain after hammering his thumb
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aim of our paper is not that of supporting the view that the study of the biological
correlates of many 1PAs is irrelevant and a waste of resources, but that the information
we can gather from 1PAs are irreducible to 3PAs and these ones cannot increase the
information we got from 1PAs even when is it possible to infer a direct causal relationship






Reply: Coltheart’s et al. warnings are valid for any correlation between cognitive functions
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successful in reducing pain due to spinal cord or peripheral lesions by applying
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about the participants’ change in pain perception. In fact, this information was obtained
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